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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this matter as 
provided by 78-2a-3(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Appeals from district court involving domestic cases, 
including but not limited to divorce, annulment, property 
division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption 
and paternity. 
iv 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS STATE OF UTAH 
RITA B. GUM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant Court of Appeals 
No. 90-0528-CA 
vs. 
JAMES RICHARD GUM, Priority Classification 
No. 16 
Defendant and Appellee 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff appealed from a final Decree of Divorce entered in 
the Third District Court, State of Utah, on the 10th day of 
September, 1990. No cross-appeal was filed. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD FOR REVIEW 
I. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, IF ANY, WILL A REVIEWING COURT 
ON APPEAL SET ASIDE OR MODIFY A FINAL CONSENT JUDGMENT (DIVORCE 
DECREE)? 
Standard of Review: A matter is not reviewable unless it is 
properly raised in the trial court. See Paffel v. Paffel. 732 P.2d 
96 (Utah 1986); Burnham v. Burnham. 716 P.2d 781 (Utah 1986); 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 (Utah 1978); Baker v. 
Baker. 551 P. 2d 1263 (Utah 1976); Riter v, Cavias; 431 P. 2d 784 
(Utah 1967). 
In the trial court the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable. The trial court may set 
aside a decree or modify the same on any of the grounds found in 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon finding 
the evidence in support thereof, the attack could include mistake, 
fraud, undue influence, coercion, material misrepresentation. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly 
discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such 
terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by 
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether 
heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action 
has not been personally served upon the defendant as 
required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to 
appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or 
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) 
any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made within a 
reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), 
not more than 3 months after the judgment, order> or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not 
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or 
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proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules 
or by an independent action. 
See also Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah 1975); Klein v. 
Klein. 511 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1973). 
II. MAY JUDICIAL BIAS BE RAISED AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL IF NOT 
RAISED AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL? DOES THE RECORD SHOW JUDICIAL 
BIAS? 
Standard of Review; If the matter is not raised as an issue 
at the trial court level, it is not reviewable. See Paffel v. 
Paffel, supra; Burnham v. Burnham, supra; Aroyle v. Aroyle, 688 
P.2d 468 (Utah 1984); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, supra? Baker v. 
Baker, supra; Riter v. Cayias, supra. 
If judicial bias is properly raised as an issue in the trial 
court, that court should look to the provisions of Rule 63(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and make appropriate findings 
thereon. 
Rule 63. Disability or Disqualification of a Judge. 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any 
action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or his attorney 
shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard 
has a bias or prejudice, either against such party or his 
attorney or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, 
such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to 
call in another judge to hear and determine the matter. 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the 
reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice 
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exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after 
the case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is 
known* If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he 
shall enter an order directing that a copy thereof be 
forthwith certified to another judge (naming him) of the 
same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which 
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit. If the judge against whom the affidavit is 
directed does not question the legal sufficiency of the 
affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is 
certified finds that it is legally sufficient, another 
judge must be called in to try the case or determine the 
matter in question. No party shall be entitled in any 
case to file more than one affidavit; and no such 
affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a 
certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and 
application are made in good faith. 
III. ARE THE FINDINGS OF FACT ON MATERIAL ISSUES RESERVED FOR 
TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH AND SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT 
(DECREE)? 
Standard of Review; The court must apply the clearly 
erroneous test as to material issues tried at the trial court 
level. See Beraer v. Beraer. 713 P.2d 695 (Utah 1985); Graff v. 
Graff 699 P. 2d 765 (Utah 1985); Bonwich v. Bonwich, 699 P. 2d 760 
(Utah 1985). 
This requirement is set forth in Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specifically and state separately its conclusions 
of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to 
Rule 58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory 
injunctions the court shall similarly set forth the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
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the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not 
necessary for purposes of review. Findings of fact, 
whether based on oral or documentary evidence, shall not 
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. The findings of 
a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall 
be considered as the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are stated orally and recorded in open court following 
the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. The trial 
court need not enter findings of fact and conclusions of 
law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 
41(b). The court shall, however, issue a brief written 
statement of the ground for its decision on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when 
the motion is based on more than one ground. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The instant action came before the trial court after numerous 
court proceedings and extensive discovery. During all the previous 
proceedings Plaintiff was represented by counsel but finally 
appeared pro se at the trial. Prior to trial Plaintiff's counsel 
withdrew and Plaintiff filed a supplement to her complaint which 
she entitled "Supplement to Complaint and Partial Response to 
Defendant's Counter Offer of July 25, 1990". (Record 173). 
By way of Plaintiff's filing the Supplement to her complaint, 
she indicated her desire to represent herself and stated therein 
her requested disposition of the issues. Plaintiff's counsel had 
withdrawn July 30, 1990, with leave of court. (Record 164 - 165). 
Notice to Appoint Successor Counsel was filed August 1, 1990. 
(Record 171). Plaintiff's Supplement to her complaint was filed on 
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the 13th of August, 1990. (Record 173). 
Upon appearance at trial, the court invited Plaintiff and 
Defendant's counsel to review the matter in an in-chambers 
conference. See Minute Entry dated September 6, 1990. (Record 
176). After lengthy review with the court, Defendant was also 
called to participate in the discussions and a full and complete 
settlement was reached on all of the issues. There was no record 
in the in-chambers conference. The parties and the court then 
convened in open court and upon the record. Certain matters for 
clarification purposes on specific items were read into the record 
and agreed to by the parties in open court and on the record. The 
parties confirmed on the record that they understood and accepted 
the terms of the agreement reached in chambers and their agreement 
was acknowledged on the record in open court. (Tr. p. 62, lines 5 
-17). 
The court requested that Defendant's counsel prepare findings, 
conclusions and a proposed decree reflecting tjie parties' 
agreement. Defendant's counsel requested the same be reviewed with 
Plaintiff before the court so that if questions arose they could be 
resolved before the court. (Tr. p. 67, lines 19 - 25; p 68, lines 
1 - 17). The findings, conclusions and proposed decree were 
prepared and made available to Plaintiff in advance and were then 
subsequently reviewed in court as scheduled on the 10th day of 
6 
September, 1990. The review with the Plaintiff and the court and 
Defendant's counsel was in full and in detail. Two changes were 
made by interlineation to reflect a mutual decree rather than the 
decree being awarded just to Defendant. (See Conclusions of Law, 
paragraph 1 at Record 197, and Decree of Divorce paragraph 1, 
Record 201). Plaintiff approved the findings, conclusions and 
decree. Defendant approved the same through counsel. The court 
approved the same and they were entered by the court signing in 
front of Plaintiff and defendant's counsel at that time. 
Plaintiff filed her Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 
the 4th day of October, 1990. (Record 207 - 209). Plaintiff seeks 
to set aside the decree and/or to modify it in several respects 
(alimony, property distribution, child support, fees and costs) and 
raises a question of judicial bias. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Defendant, James R. Gum, purchased a home in 1970 with 
his first wife who passed away during their marriage making him a 
widower. His first marriage lasted in excess of twenty seven (27) 
years before her death. Plaintiff and Defendant married on the 
24th day of March, 1982 (Record 2, par. 2); it being a second 
marriage of Defendant and a third marriage of Plaintiff. Both of 
Plaintiff's former marriages ended in divorce. The parties had a 
very stormy relationship. They were separated on numerous 
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occasions and filed three divorce actions against one another; one 
of which lay dormant for some time and then was amended. Those 
actions were filed March 26, 1987, amended October 12, 1988; a 
second action October 31, 1988; and the instant action on the 8th 
day of March, 1990. The parties ceased living together entirely 
after the filing of the third complaint. 
2. Plaintiff was represented by counsel in each action. In 
the instant action by Delbert Welker, succeeded by Earl S. 
Spafford, who withdrew on the 31st day of July, 1990. (Record 162 
- 165). Plaintiff then represented herself, making known that 
desire, and filing her supplement to her complaint on the 13th day 
of August, 1990. (Record 173). The case was scheduled for trial 
on the 6th day of September, 1990. (Record 174). 
3. Plaintiff had four children by one of her former 
marriages, all of which children were adopted by Defendant. Two 
were minors at the time of trial, Amy, born March 14, 1975, now 16 
years of age; and Joy, born September 22, 1976, now 14 1/2 years of 
age. 
4. Pursuant to the court's order entered at a hearing on the 
11th day of July, 1990, concerning Plaintiff's failure to abide by 
the previous orders of the court by not vacating the home, the 
court entered an order requiring the home to be sold and the net 
funds held for disposition at the time of trial. (Tr. p. 42, lines 
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6 - 25; p. 43 - 47, to line 8). Pursuant to that order, the home 
was sold August 24, 1990 and proceeds of $10,202.00 were available 
with the escrow agent at the time of trial. (Record 191, par. 5; 
Addendum to Plaintiff's Brief at A-64). 
5. Defendant had retired from his employment at Union 
Pacific Railroad in 1988 after having open heart surgery with a 
triple by-pass the previous year. Defendant is a serious diabetic 
and must receive insulin. (Record 180, par. 8) Plaintiff had 
previous work experience as a teacher and secretarial experience 
and was employed at the time of trial at the Hilton Hotel, earning 
$563.00 per month. (Record 191 - 192, par. 8). 
6. At the time Plaintiff vacated the home just prior to sale 
in August, 1990, Plaintiff removed from the home almost all of the 
parties' personal property items which were located therein, 
including Defendant's premarital items. A list of those items was 
annexed as Exhibit A to Defendant's Trial Brief. (Record 178 -
187). 
7. Plaintiff in her original Verified Complaint requested 
$1.00 per year alimony. (Record 4) Plaintiff in her Supplement to 
Complaint requested that no alimony be awarded to either party; 
that the proceeds of the sale of the home be divided between the 
parties as the court would determine; that support be provided for 
the children in accordance with the guidelines; that any other 
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matters in dispute be resolved by the court. No request was made 
for fees or costs. (Record 173). 
8. Plaintiff's Supplement to her Complaint was entitled in 
part "Response to Defendant's Counter Offer of July 25, 1990". 
(Record 173) The July 25, 1990 counter offer is incorporated in a 
letter to Plaintiff's then counsel, Mr. Earl S. Spafford and is 
shown in the Addendum to Appellant's Brief at A-48. The Supplement 
to Complaint and Counter Offer of July 25, 1990, referred to herein 
was available to the court and became the starting point for the 
in-chambers discussion of the court on the day of trial, September 
6, 1990, resulting in a complete settlement. 
9. When the findings, conclusions and decree were prepared, 
the findings recited the agreement of the parties and stated in 
language to convey that understanding "the parties agreed". 
(Record 189 - 196) 
10. The following findings are those attacked either by 
specific number or in substance by Plaintiff in her appeal, and in 
each instance the finding reflects that the parties agreed: 
Finding #13: 
The parties have agreed to share copies of a picture 
album. (Emphasis supplied) 
Finding #14 reads: 
The parties agreed that the Plaintiff would be paid the 
sum of $3,000.00 from the proceeds of the sale of the 
home upon the date of entry of the decree provided 
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Plaintiff has returned the Llardro, the hunting rifle, 
the sword and the binoculars; and that except for the 
personal items of property identified which have been 
divided between the parties, all other property of the 
Defendant would remain as his sole and separate property, 
including his pension, savings and benefit plans and all 
personal property in his possession. (Emphasis supplied) 
Finding #15 reads: 
The parties agreed that no alimony would be awarded to 
either party. (Emphasis supplied) 
Finding #16 reads: 
The parties agreed that the support for the minor 
children would be in accordance with the Uniform Child 
Support Schedules and that there is no reason for the 
court to deviate therefrom. (Emphasis supplied) 
Finding #17 reads: 
The parties agreed that each would pay for their 
respective attorney's fees and costs. (Emphasis 
supplied) 
(Record 194, paragraph 13 through 195 paragraph 17.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. A reviewing court will not set aside or modify a consent 
decree in the absence of showing fraud, undue influence, coercion, 
mistake of a material fact, misrepresentation of a material fact or 
showing that the consent was not actually given. 
The factual determination of matters are for the trial court 
in accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
and are not reviewable if not raised at the trial level, supra. 
II. It is clear that consent was given by the parties and a 
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settlement was reached and confirmed by the court. 
It is clear from the record that Plaintiff had agreed to the 
terms of the settlement (Tr. p. 62, lines 5 - 17), and agreed to 
the findings of fact as they were entered by making affirmation, 
approval and acceptance of the same before the court at the time of 
entry September 10, 1990. 
III. Plaintiff has failed to meet the burden to marshal the 
evidence and the facts from the record bearing on her request that 
the decree be set aside or modified. 
Procedurally a petition to modify must first be brought at the 
trial court level. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, supra. Plaintiff does not claim that the findings, 
conclusions or decree were procured or entered through fraud, 
misrepresentation, coercion or undue influence, or that there was 
a mistake of a material fact. 
IV. It is clear there was an agreement confirmed by the 
parties and the court. 
Plaintiff consented and agreed on the record and in writing to 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
V. Plaintiff's claim of judicial bias is without merit. 
Plaintiff has claimed judicial bias, raising her claim for the 
first time at the appellate level. She has failed to meet the 
requirements of Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduref 
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supra. Judicial bias cannot be reviewed if not claimed at the 
trial court level. 
VI. The Findings of Fact are consistent with and sufficient 
to support the judgment of the court. 
Plaintiff seeks relief in the Court of Appeals attacking 
specific findings as being insufficient to support the decree or to 
allow an appropriate analysis of the findings. Plaintiff has 
failed to marshal the evidence from the record and has failed to 
meet the clearly erroneous test of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, supra. 
VII. There is ample evidence in the record to show the 
reasonableness of the property division. 
Plaintiff claims error in not awarding permanent alimony and 
seeks a modification of the property distribution. Both of these 
claims were removed from issue and dispute by the consent and 
agreement of the parties in their settlement, confirmed by each and 
the court. These matters are not reviewable. A modification 
petition should first have been pursued at the trial court level, 
and then under appropriate circumstances the appellate court could 
review the trial court's determination. Plaintiff has not and 
cannot meet the clearly erroneous test of Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, with respect to the substance of 
her claims regarding alimony or the property division. 
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VIII. Plaintiff offers no theory for review or relief on her 
claim against the "quick sale" of the house. The matter is not 
reviewable. 
Plaintiff now, at the appellate level, complains of the "quick 
sale". Both parties participated in and accomplished the "quick 
sale", and there is no judicial remedy remaining. That matter was 
not pursued at the trial court level and is not reviewable. 
IX. Ancillary matters 
A. Plaintiff's claim that the findings of fact are 
insufficient regarding child support is without merit. 
B. Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not 
awarding fees and costs is without merit. 
C. Plaintiff's complaint of the existence of a clerical 
error does not give rise to an appellate issue. 
D. Plaintiff's claim for lost child support owed by a former 
husband is without merit. 
E. Plaintiff's claim that the decree should be set aside as 
a mutual decree and requesting that the decree be awarded to her on 
the grounds of cruelty is without merit. 
ARGUMENT 
I. MATTERS RAISED BY PLAINTIFF ARE NOT REVIEWABLE. 
The questions raised by Plaintiff in her appeal are not 
totally compatible and consistent with the relief she has 
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requested. An examination should first be made as to the nature of 
the matters she assigns as error. Plaintiff has alluded to six (6) 
specific errors which in substance seek to have the Appellate Court 
set aside or modify the decree. Two additional claims of error can 
be discerned, one pertaining to Plaintiff's complaint of the "quick 
sale" of Defendant's premarital home and one complaining judicial 
bias. 
Plaintiff's requests to the appellate court for orders may be 
enumerated as follows: 
(1) Vacating the mutual decree which was awarded on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, modifying it and awarding it 
to her on the grounds of cruelty. 
(2) Modifying the child support. 
(3) Modifying the decree and awarding permanent alimony. 
(4) Modifying the decree and redistributing property. 
(5) Modifying the decree awarding costs and attorneys 
fees through the time of trial and on appeal. 
(6) Modifying the decree awarding Plaintiff an interest 
in Defendant's retirement plan. 
(7) Ruling that the "quick sale" was improper. 
(8) Ruling that there was judicial bias. 
The threshold question here is whether a reviewing court will 
set aside or modify a final consent judgment, and if so, under what 
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circumstances. The analysis begins with determining whether there 
is an appealable issue and whether an appropriate effort has been 
made to set aside or modify the decree at the trial court level. 
If a timely and appropriate motion is made# the trial court 
must look to the provisions as expressed in Rule 60(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra. Then if the trial court errs in 
ruling on the motion, the appellate court may review the 
deliberation and make appropriate disposition which could include 
setting aside or modifying the decree. 
If an appellate court were to vacate a consent decree, it 
would be performing the task of a trial court, which is the trier 
of fact, and would be acting in an arbitrary and capricious fashion 
by not allowing the opposing party to marshal the facts in support 
of the findings and decree. To set aside a decree, whether it be 
a consent decree or otherwise, is a matter for the trial court in 
accordance with Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
supra. Until the trial court has acted upon a proper motion, there 
is no appealable issue. 
If an appellate court should become inclined to review the 
facts and circumstances behind a consent judgment or to remand it 
to the trial court for specific findings under strict standards (as 
if the issue had been tried on the evidence), then a significant 
chilling effect would inhibit litigants and attorneys from 
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negotiating and settling disputes short of a full trial on the 
merits and on the record. Under such a scenario, the positive 
efforts of the legal system to encourage settlement would be 
negated and of no avail and the respect for and the inviolability 
of the legal system would be in decline. 
II. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE RECORD THAT THE PARTIES SETTLED ALL 
ISSUES. 
Where the parties stipulate and settle disputed issues, the 
issues upon which they agree are removed from the litigation as 
contested issues and require no further determination by the court. 
They no longer are issues where the parties have agreed they should 
not be issues to be tried to a court. The court in approving the 
agreement of the parties, merely confirms the same after finding it 
reasonable to do so. The court in confirming the settlement of the 
parties must be presumed to have reviewed it for reasonableness. 
The trial court in such circumstances, provided it finds the same 
reasonable, should not be required to impose its views upon the 
parties on matters not at issue and need not make detailed analysis 
or lay down specific or general principles of that analysis. It is 
superfluous to do so where the issue has been removed from the 
case by settlement. Had the trial court in the instant action 
not accepted or approved as reasonable the agreement of the 
parties, it could be presumed that it would have required the 
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parties to proceed with trial and the production of evidence so 
that a final determination could be made by the court. 
III. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET HER BURDEN TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE FROM THE RECORD TO SHOW THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS. 
Plaintiff has the burden to marshal the evidence and the facts 
from the record to show that the decree encompassing the parties' 
agreement should be set aside, modified or amended. (Procedurally 
that must be done at the trial court level. Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra). That burden has not been met by 
Plaintiff. 
The evidence which Plaintiff would be required to marshal and 
to present at the trial court level to set aside the decree would 
be evidence of material mistakes, fraud, material 
misrepresentation, coercion, and/or undue influence. Then in the 
language of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proceduref supraf 
"On motion and upon such terms as are just " the court could 
receive the evidence and make a determination. Plaintiff has not 
proceeded in the trial court; neither has she pointed to any 
evidence in the record which would show mistake, material 
misrepresentation, fraud, coercion, undue influence or any other 
matters that would justify her requested relief. Plaintiff has 
not and cannot meet her burden. 
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IV. IT IS CJLEAR THERE WAS AM AGREEMENT CONFIRMED BY THE 
PARTIES AND THE COURT. 
The question then becomes whether the parties had an 
agreement, and if so, whether it will be as enforceable as other 
agreements. See Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d 472, 475 (Utah 1975); 
Klein v. Klein, 511 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1973). 
In Klein v. Klein, 544 P. 2d 472, 475 (Utah 1975), the 
appellant answered audibly before the court on the record that he 
accepted the stipulation of the parties and understood the same. 
The appellate court said that the same rules apply to binding the 
parties to their consent and stipulation as apply to any other 
agreements. Their agreement cannot be repudiated without reason or 
justification. 
In the instant action the Plaintiff does not claim any fraud, 
undue influence, misrepresentation, mistake of a material fact or 
anything else that would allow her to repudiate her agreement which 
she confirmed in court on the record, (Tr. p. 62, lines 5 - 1 7 ) , 
and affirmed once again by approving the findings, conclusions and 
decree before the court on the date the decree was signed and 
entered. 
As indicated in Klein v. Klein, Id. the power of a trial 
court to render a judgment by consent of the parties is dependent 
upon the existence of the consent at the time the agreement 
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receives the sanction of the court. 
In the instant case that is precisely what was done. Consent 
was given after a thorough review of all the language of the 
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree before the court 
and then signed by the court in the very presence of the Plaintiff 
and counsel for Defendant. 
V. NO ISSUE OF JUDICIAL BIAS HAS BEEN PROPERLY RAISED. 
The appellate court will not review a claim of judicial bias 
raised for the first time at the appellate level. 
Matters of judicial bias are governed by the provisions, 
requirements and procedures of Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, supra. Plaintiff has made no showing whatsoever 
that she raised the issue of judicial bias at the trial level. 
Neither has Plaintiff pointed to any substantive showing in the 
record of any judicial bias. 
Rule 63(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supra. 
contemplates that as soon as a party believes there is a bias, that 
party has the burden to make that known to the court in affidavit 
form and in good faith. The rule also contemplates that a 
determination of the claim of bias would be made from the evidence; 
all of which must happen at the trial level. A claim of judicial 
bias against a trial judge, as in other matters, cannot be raised 
for the first time on appeal. See Paffel v. Paffel. supra; Burnham 
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v, Burnham, supra; Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, supra: Baker v. Baker, 
supra; Riter v. Cayias, supra. 
VI. THE FINDINGS OF FACT ARE CONSISTENT WITH AND SUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT. 
Even if the Appellate Court determined that Plaintiff somehow 
had raised matters appropriately in the trial court to modify or 
set aside the decree, which had then been rejected by the trial 
court, the clearly erroneous test as required by Rule 52(a) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, would apply. 
The party attacking the findings has the burden to marshal the 
evidence and the facts from the record to show that the findings 
are clearly erroneous when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the other party. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1987); 
Burnham v. Burnham, supra; Graff v, Graff, supra; Bushel v. Bushelf 
649 P.2d 85 (Utah 1982); Stuki v. Stuki, 562 P.2d 240 (Utah 1977); 
Baker v. Baker, supra; Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975); 
Mitchell v, Mitchell, 527 P. 2d 1359 (Utah 1974); Haumont v. 
Haumont, 793 P.2d 421 (Utah App. 1990); Cook v. Cook, 739 P.2d 90 
(Utah App. 1987); Tallev v. Talley, 739 P.2d 83 (Utah App. 1987), 
The trial court must be given broad latitude and significant 
deference in its findings of fact even where they are findings 
pertaining to material issues that were tried on the evidence to 
the court. Burnham v. Burnham, supra; Argvle v. Argvle, supra; 
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Despain v. Despain. 610 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1980); Baker v. Bakerf 
supra; Hansen v. Hansen, supra; Mitchell v. Mitchell, supra; Searle 
v. Searle. 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); Whitehead v. Whitehead. 397 
P.2d 987 (Utah 1965); Cook v. Cook, supra. 
In the instant case the issues Plaintiff wishes to address 
were removed from the litigation by the litigants in a complete 
settlement. Since the decree of the court is based upon the 
consent and agreement of the parties, the standard of review must 
be entirely different than if the facts were tried to the court 
upon the evidence. The appellate court is unable to conduct any 
review of matters that were not at issue in the trial court. In 
the instant case issues of alimony, property distribution, fees and 
costs, and child support were all removed from dispute by the 
litigants in their settlement. See Despain v. Despain. supra; 
Klein v. Klein. 544 P.2d 472 (Utah 1975). 
It is clear that the appellate court can review both law and 
facts in domestic cases involving divorce, but the appellate court 
reviews the trial court's determination with the presumption that 
it is correct and the burden is on the one attacking the trial 
court's determination to show that the trial court's findings are 
clearly erroneous. Beraer v. Beraer. supra; Bonwich v. Bonwich. 
supra; Graff v. Graff, supra. Searle v. Searle. supra; Mitchell v. 
Mitchell, supra; Hansen v. Hansen, supra; Aroyle v. Aroyle. supra; 
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Turner v. Turnerr 649 P.2d 6,8 (Utah 1982). 
If Plaintiff had properly raised the issue of alimony at the 
trial level then the clearly erroneous test would be applicable to 
the trial court's findings. The principles set out in the case of 
Jones v. Jones. 700 P. 2d, 1072 (Utah 1985) and the numerous cases 
which have followed those principles would be looked to for 
guidance. See Haumont v. Haumont, supra. That analysis and 
review cannot be done where alimony was not a material issue. In 
the instant action alimony was removed as an issue at the request 
of Plaintiff in the filing of her Supplement to Complaint (Record 
173); by her affirmance of the agreement in open court on the 
record (Tr. p. 62, lines 2 - 17), and finally by Plaintiff's 
affirming and approving the specific findings of fact which recited 
the parties' agreement before the court on the 10th day of 
September, 1990f the date of entry of decree. 
If the court were to look strictly at the sufficiency of the 
evidence, ignoring all procedural difficulties and appropriate 
reviewable issues, Plaintiff should still fail in her attack. 
It is Plaintiff's burden to marshal all the evidence in the 
Record and Transcript bearing on the findings which she attacks. 
Those matters must then be viewed in the light most favorable to 
Defendant and found to be clearly erroneous before an appellate 
court will disturb them. A review of the specific findings 
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attacked by Plaintiff will show that she has not and cannot meet 
her burden: 
FINDING #11 of the findings of fact deal with personal 
property items and is very specific as to the items in Plaintiff's 
possession. (Record 193) 
FINDING #12 deals with personal property items in Defendant's 
possession and is very specific as to the same. The only values 
with respect to items of personal property were those shown in 
Defendant's Exhibit to his Trial Brief. (Record 184 - 187). Those 
values were never disputed by Plaintiff. 
FINDING #13 deals with the picture album and reflects that the 
parties agreed on how to deal with it. (Record 194). 
FINDING #14 deals with the payment to Plaintiff of $3,000.00 
from the sales proceeds of the premarital home of Defendant (Record 
194), and specifically states that all other property, including 
specifically Defendant's pension, savings and benefit plans and 
personal property in his possession would remain as his sole and 
separate property. (Record 195). The finding reflects by the use 
of its language that the parties agreed thereto. (Record 194). 
FINDING #15 deals with alimony and reflects that the parties 
agreed that there would be none to either party. (Record 193). 
That agreement is consistent with Plaintiff's request in the 
Supplement to Complaint (Record 173). Admittedly the finding 
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regarding alimony does not go into an analysis as to the financial 
circumstances of Plaintiff as set out in Jones v. Jones, supra. 
However Plaintiff in her appeal does not specifically assign as 
error that Finding #15 is defective. Where a matter is not so 
assigned, the reviewing court cannot review it. 
Should this court desire to look at the substance of the 
matters bearing on alimony considerations# there is ample evidence 
in the record to show the parties' circumstances. Those circum-
stances are as follows: 
(1) Defendant retired after six (6) years of the marriage and 
after having had heart surgery with a triple by-pass. Defendant is 
a serious diabetic and receives insulin. Defendant was 59 years of 
age on the date of trial, born the 5th day of January, 1931. 
Through Defendant's pension and retirement programs he receives 
$3,096.72 per month. (Record 191) There is no lump sum available 
to him. 
(2) Plaintiff was 53 years of age at trial time, her 
birthdate is January 20, 1937. Plaintiff was employed at the time 
of trial at the Hilton Hotel, earning $563.00 per month. (Record 
190 - 192) 
(3) The parties married on the 24th day of March, 1982. 
(Record 2). 
(4) The parties had a stormy marriage, numerous separations, 
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three divorce cases, one of which was amended, and lived together 
not at all after the filing of the latest complaint. (Record 178) 
(5) Defendant had one previous marriage which ended with his 
wife's death after more than twenty seven (27) years of marriage 
(Record 178). 
(6) Plaintiff had two former marriages, both of which ended 
in divorce. (Record 179). 
(7) The house on the avenues in Salt Lake was premarital 
property of Defendant having been purchased with his first wife in 
1970. (Record 178 - 181). The remodeling of the avenues home came 
from Defendant's premarital savings. Payments on the mortgage came 
from Defendant's earnings and his retirement benefits since his 
retirement in 1988. (Record 181) (Tr. p. 4, lines 3 - 19). 
Defendant testified that Plaintiff did not provide any money toward 
the purchase, remodeling, payment or upkeep of the home. (Tr. p. 
4, lines 20 - 24). Ample evidence is present in the record to 
support the judgment of the court. 
VII. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD TO SHOW THE 
REASONABLENESS OF THE PROPERTY DIVISION. 
Plaintiff made no claim in her complaint against Defendant's 
son's West Valley house that she now claims on appeal is a second 
house belonging to the parties. (Record 2 - 8). Neither did 
Plaintiff request any interest in what she now calls the second 
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home in the Supplement to her Complaint. (Record 173). Plaintiff 
now on appeal wishes to raise the so-called second home as an issue 
and have the reviewing court make a factual determination regarding 
it. 
At a hearing under oath, Plaintiff was asked if she claimed 
that any of her individual monies had gone into the purchase of the 
West Valley home. She answered no. She was then asked a series of 
questions; whether she made any of the payments, she answered no; 
whether she had made any of the utility payments, her answer was 
no; whether she paid any taxes on the home, her answer was no. 
(Tr. p. 32, lines 4 - 1 4 ) . 
Where an issue is properly presented to the court and tried on 
the evidence, the appellate court will not disturb a property 
distribution on appeal unless the court is satisfied that the 
property distribution is unjust or constitutes a clear abuse of 
discretion. Bettinaer v. Bettinaer. 793 P.2d 389 (Utah App. 1990); 
Haumont v. Haumont, supra. Clearly the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion regarding Defendant's son's West Valley home or 
other property. 
With respect to the property division, it is clear that the 
parties removed those matters as issues and settled their 
differences and that settlement was approved by the parties and 
given sanction by the court. It is also clear on a review of the 
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record that Plaintiff has not and cannot meet her burden to show 
that the findings are clearly erroneous regarding the property 
division. Beraer v. Beraer, supra; Graff v. Graff, supra; Bonvich 
v. Bonwich? supra. 
The parties were married only six years while Defendant was 
accruing retirement benefits. Defendant's retirement benefits are 
$3,095.00 per month. The home sale proceeds which were distributed 
in part to Plaintiff represented premarital property. It cannot be 
clearly inequitable to award Plaintiff an interest in one asset 
rather than the other. 
VIII. PLAINTIFF OFFERS MO THEORY FOR REVIEW OR RELIEF ON HER 
CLAIH AGAINST THE "QUICK SALE" OF TBOS HOUSE. THE MATTER IS NOT 
REVIEWABLE. 
Plaintiff's claim that the court erred in ordering a quick 
sale of the parties7 home is moot and meaningless. No remedy or 
relief can be designed by the appellate court. 
Even if we agree that the act of the court in requiring the 
home to be sold was an unwise act, the damage if any, was shared by 
the parties. Any harm or damage was more unfavorable to Defendant 
than to Plaintiff because the home represented his primary asset 
and premarital property. 
Defendant also can offer no theory to the reviewing court for 
a correction of that matter. It is now an accomplished fact and 
28 
there has been acquiescence by each of the parties who have divided 
the proceeds in accordance with their agreement. 
IX. ANCILLARY MATTERS. 
A. Plaintiff's claim that the findings of fact are 
insufficient regarding child support is without merit. 
Plaintiff's claim that the findings of fact are insufficient 
with respect to determining child support is totally without merit 
as can be determined by a review of those findings. (Record 191 -
para. 7 & 8, Record 192 balance of paragraph 8 and paragraph 9). 
B. Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not 
awarding fees and costs is without merit. 
Plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in not awarding 
her fees and costs rests on the same foundation or lack thereof as 
the primary portion of her attack and must fall for the same 
reasons. She did not request fees in the Supplement to Complaint. 
(Record 173). Plaintiff presented no evidence and did not reserve 
fees and costs as an issue to be tried. Plaintiff did not put on 
evidence of amount of fees and costs or the necessity or 
reasonableness. See Talley v. Talley. supra; Delatore v. Delatore, 
680 P.2d 27, 28 (Utah 1984). Plaintiff agreed that each party 
would pay their separate costs and fees as reflected in the 
findings confirmed by her audibly on the record. (Tr. p. 62, lines 
5-17) and confirmed by her once again by approving the findings 
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of fact, conclusions of law and decree on the date of entry before 
the court. 
C Plaintiff's complaint of a harmless clerical error does 
not rise to a level to entitle her to relief. 
Plaintiff complains of a clerical error which is harmless 
error under Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and may be 
corrected in accordance with Rule 60(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a). Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, 
orders or other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by 
the court at any time of its own initiative or on the 
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the 
court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such 
mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the 
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court. 
Rule 61. Harmless error. No error in either the 
admission or the exclusion of evidence, and no error or 
defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or 
omitted by the court or by any of the parties, is ground 
for granting a new trial or otherwise disturbing a 
judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with substantial 
justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must 
disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which 
does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. 
Plaintiff has raised a question regarding what appears clearly 
as a clerical error but has not sought relief therefrom. The error 
is typographical or clerical, picked up from a pre-programmed 
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letterhead. While it is not clear from the appellant's brief what 
her claims are regarding that matter, counsel feels compelled to 
respond. The computer program or the person preparing the 
pleadings typed, in the caption, that Defendant's counsel was 
attorney for Plaintiff. In each instance the pleading was clearly 
signed by counsel as Attorney for Defendant, not Plaintiff. There 
was never any confusion by either party or the court as to present 
counsel for Defendant assuming any representation for Plaintiff. 
None has been demonstrated by Plaintiff; none could honestly be 
demonstrated. It was harmless error, subject to correction in 
accordance with Rule 60(a), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
supra. Counsel requests the correction be made and become 
effective for all pleadings in the case. 
D. Plaintiff's claim for lost child support owed by a former 
husband is without merit. 
plaintiff has raised a question regarding the sufficiency of 
the findings of fact with respect to child support. However, in 
Plaintiff's argument she asserts that she is somehow entitled to be 
compensated for lost back child support owed by the children's 
natural father prior to adoption by Defendant. There is no 
evidence in the record to show that Plaintiff made that request 
prior to the appellate level. It is entirely without merit. 
E. Plaintiff's claim that the decree should be set aside as 
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a mutual decree and requesting that the decree be awarded to her on 
the grounds of cruelty is without merit. See Haumont v. Haumontr 
supra« 
If there had been any basis to set the decree aside, Plaintiff 
should have pursued her claim through the trial court in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, supra. However, with respect to the substance of her 
thrust regarding grounds, it can be noted that the only evidence 
which Plaintiff can marshal and present before the reviewing court 
on that issue is found at Tr. p. 64, lines 4-18) where Defendant 
was called to testify regarding grounds. 
Q. You have alleged in your counterclaim, and she 
alleged in her complaint, certain differences between you 
that have become irreconcilable. Would you tell the 
court what you feel is irreconcilable about this 
marriage, briefly? 
A. Yes, we were constantly fighting throughout the 
marriage for a period of more than six years, and it just 
became unbearable for both of us. 
Q. Do you desire that this marriage be terminated? 
A. Yes, do I. [sic] 
Q. Do you think the differences between the two of you 
are irreconcilable? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Plaintiff did not take the stand to testify regarding any 
grounds. There is no evidence controverting the grounds to which 
Defendant testified. Under the evidence presented, it is clear 
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that the court had the power to grant the decree on the basis of 
irreconcilable differences consistent with the provision of Rule 
30-3-1(3)(h) Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, 
30-3-1 Procedure - Residence - Grounds 
(1) Proceedings in divorce are commenced and 
conducted as provided by law for proceedings 
in civil causes, except as provided in this 
chapter. 
(2) The court may decree a dissolution of the 
marriage contract between the plaintiff and 
defendant on the grounds specified in 
Subsection (3) 
(3) Grounds for Divorce: 
(h) Irreconcilable differences of the marriage; 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee respectfully requests the court of appeals to affirm 
the decree in all its particulars, awarding no costs or fees to 
appellant. 
I. Plaintiff has failed entirely to raise an appealable 
issue and her claims are frivolous. 
II. Plaintiff's claim of judicial bias is untimely and 
totally without merit. 
III. Plaintiff failed to marshal the evidence to support her 
claims of abuse of discretion or her claim that the trial court's 
findings are clearly erroneous. 
IV. The Record and Transcript show the findings were 
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consistent with and adequate to support the consent decree. 
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